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Abstract 
Corporations are increasingly under pressure to improve their environmental performance and to account 
for potential risks and opportunities associated with climate change. In this paper, we examine the 
effectiveness of monetary and nonmonetary incentives provided by companies to their employees in order 
to reduce carbon emissions. Specifically, we find evidence that the use of monetary incentives is 
associated with higher carbon emissions. This result holds both in cross-sectional and time-series 
analysis. Moreover, we find that the use of nonmonetary incentives is associated with lower carbon 
emissions. Consistent with monetary incentives crowding out motivation for pro-social behavior, we find 
that the effect of monetary incentives on carbon emissions is mitigated when these incentives are 
provided to employees with formally assigned responsibility for environmental performance. 
Furthermore, by employing a two-stage multinomial logistic model, we provide insights into factors 
affecting companies’ decisions on incentive provision, as well as showing that the impact of monetary 
incentives on carbon emissions remains significant even when we control for potential selection bias in 
our sample. 
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1.  Introduction 
Climate change is currently a topic of great interest to corporations, investors, policy makers, and 
academics. The Stern Review, commissioned by the British Government, estimates the overall costs and 
risks of climate change to be equivalent to losing at least 5% of global GDP each year (i.e., over $3 
trillion for 2010). Because of the role of greenhouse gases like carbon emissions in causing global 
warming and the massive consequences that climate change may have on the planet, a plethora of 
initiatives seeking to reduce the carbon emissions of both public and private organizations have emerged 
around the globe. Accordingly, many corporations are providing incentives to their employees geared 
towards reducing carbon emissions resulting from the firm’s operations. Typically, the incentives 
provided to employees fall within two broad categories: they can be either monetary (e.g., cash bonuses) 
or nonmonetary (e.g., public recognition usually in the form of awards). In this paper, we investigate how 
effective such incentives are in terms of reducing carbon emissions for the firms that provide them.    
Although policy makers have previously attempted to establish what came to be termed as a 
“carbon market,”  currently no global price has emerged for carbon emissions and, as a result, 
organizations with high emissions are not legally required to internalize the negative externalities that 
they impose on the environment, other organizations, and the society at large. Yet a number of 
organizations have voluntarily and unilaterally adopted corporate policies that require reduction of carbon 
emissions being generated by their operations. Such attempts at reducing carbon emissions can be 
characterized as pro-social behaviors (Benabou and Tirole, 2006) if the underlying reasoning for reducing 
emissions is not maximizing private gains but contributing to the public good.   
However, many argue that companies voluntarily reduce carbon emissions because doing so is 
consistent with profit maximization. Greater energy efficiency saves money and carbon emissions at the 
same time. Furthermore, mounting social awareness with regards to the detrimental effects of climate 
change and the real possibility of regulatory and legislative actions provide other reasons for companies 
to voluntarily limit their carbon emissions. Doing so can lead to a positive reputation as a “good corporate 
citizen,” thereby attracting employees and customers who are concerned about climate change and Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2133004
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preserving the company’s socially-determined “license to operate.”  It can also lead to getting the benefit 
of the doubt from regulators regarding environmental issues already covered by regulation. Long-term 
investors who believe that future regulations are likely and/or who are “universal owners” and concerned 
about the effects of climate change on their overall portfolio will favor companies that are proactively 
responding to the relationship between carbon emissions and climate change. Finally, companies which 
make the investment today to reduce their carbon emissions will be in a strong position should regulation 
mandate reduced emissions or establish a price on them. They will conceivably have had the opportunity 
to phase in the investments required to do so, will be more knowledgeable about what is required to 
reduce emissions and, as a result, will be able to more quickly respond to new regulations and at a lower 
cost. All of these benefits to voluntarily reducing carbon emissions, even if they entail some short-term 
cost disadvantages due to the required investment, can create a competitive advantage in the long term. 
When the company makes a compelling economic argument for reducing carbon emissions it is less likely 
to be seen by employees as a pro-social activity but rather as a strategically implemented policy by the 
firm in order to remain competitive in product, labor, and capital markets.  
Why employees exert efforts to reduce carbon emissions can have significant implications for the 
optimal design of incentive contracts. On the one hand, if employees are intrinsically motivated to reduce 
carbon emissions because they believe this will contribute to the public good then providing monetary 
incentives to reduce carbon emissions might actually crowd-out intrinsic motivation and lead to higher 
emissions. On the other hand, if employees exert efforts to reduce carbon emission because they believe 
this is economically the best course of action to ensure maximizing long-term profitability then monetary 
incentives will be effective at motivating employees. Here, we provide the first set of evidence towards 
answering this question. In particular, using data for a cross-section of firms across the globe, we find that 
firms that provide monetary incentives have higher carbon emissions compared to firms that give no 
incentives on environmental performance. Furthermore, we find that firms that provide nonmonetary 
incentives have lower carbon emissions compared to firms that give no incentives. We find these results 
after controlling for other determinants of carbon emission levels, such as the scale of the firm’s 4 
 
operations, the adoption of corporate policies to reduce carbon emissions, the existence of commercial 
opportunities and risks from climate change, and the quality of sustainability governance. Moreover, we 
control for industry, country, and year fixed effects or for industry and country time-varying effects. In 
further analysis, we find similar results when we include firm fixed effects and estimate the coefficients 
using only within firm variation, as well as when we track the time-series evolution of carbon emissions 
for a matched sample of firms.  
We further parse this question by varying the degree to which efforts to reduce carbon emissions 
is considered as pro-social behavior by employees. We posit that employees whose job descriptions 
explicitly include the responsibility for environmental performance and emissions reduction will be less 
likely to consider such goals as pro-social behavior since they are being rewarded for the instrumental 
reasons for doing so. Consistent with this argument, we empirically find that the negative effect of 
monetary incentives on reducing carbon emissions is completely mitigated when these incentives are 
provided to employees with direct responsibility for environmental performance. This is because their job 
responsibilities are based on an economic rationale for reduction in carbon emissions. 
Finally, as a robustness test, we implement a two-stage multinomial logistic model, explicitly 
accounting in the first stage for a number of factors that could drive the probability of a focal firm 
choosing to adopt a monetary, a nonmonetary, both-monetary-and-non-monetary, or a  no-incentive 
scheme linked to environmental goals. The results of this analysis are consistent with our main findings 
regarding the impact of monetary incentives. We also directionally find consistent but statistically 
insignificant results for the impact of non-monetary incentives on carbon emissions. 
This study extends and complements a literature that investigates, documents, and explains the 
relative effectiveness of monetary vs. non-monetary incentives for improving task performance, 
especially when efforts are likely to be seen as pro-social behavior. First, by providing empirical evidence 
on such a critical issue as carbon emissions, we contribute to the debate in the literature on whether 
monetary incentives are effective in motivating particular and desired individual behaviors. On the one 
hand, there has been a large experimental literature documenting the negative effects of monetary 5 
 
incentives broadly known as the “crowding-out” effect. That is, monetary incentives can crowd out 
intrinsic motivation or reputational motivation for agents engaging in a given task and therefore result in 
the worsening of task performance. On the other hand, Prendergast (1999) notes that there is little 
conclusive empirical evidence documenting that monetary incentives could crowd-out motivation and 
lead to worse performance in workplace settings. Similarly, Gibbons (1998) suggests that management 
practices based on economic models may dampen non-economic realities such as motivation and social 
relations, and that empirical data would be useful in deepening our understanding of this issue. Whether 
and under what conditions do the negative effects of monetary incentives emerge in a real work place 
setting remain open questions. Our analysis provides empirical evidence that for tasks involving pro-
social elements, monetary incentives are not effective and actually detrimental unless they are provided to 
people for whom such tasks constitute part of their formal job responsibility; otherwise, non-monetary 
incentives are likely to be more effective. 
In addition, we contribute to the accounting literature that deals with how the task type and the 
type of incentive scheme affect the efficacy of monetary incentives and may influence the design of 
management accounting and control systems.  In reviewing numerous laboratory-based studies in this 
literature, Bonner et al. (2000) find that monetary incentives improve performance in only about half of 
the experiments and argue that, as tasks become more cognitively complex, monetary incentives become 
less effective. Complementing this line of work, our study posits that an additional task characteristic, its 
pro-social nature, significantly impacts the effectiveness of different types of incentives and should also 
be considered in the design of accounting and control systems.  
The remaining of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the motivation for this study 
and presents the literature review. Section 3 presents the sample and summary statistics. Section 4 
discusses the results from the analyses. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
2.  Motivation and Literature Review 
Carbon emissions can be thought of as the classic case of an externality. Organizations that emit large 
amounts of carbon increase the probability of future adverse environmental events that may negatively 6 
 
affect numerous other organizations, investors, and society as a whole. However, they do not internalize 
all the costs associated with carbon emissions since organizations with high carbon emissions might not 
be themselves adversely and directly affected by climate change (for example, due to their geographic 
location and due to the absence of a global carbon tax). Due to the firm not directly bearing the costs of its 
negative externalities and the lack of Pigovian taxation
1, organizations emit more carbon than it is socially 
optimal. Consequently, employees of organizations that perceive their company as voluntarily engaging 
in activities to limit the negative externalities their company imposes on society without a direct or 
indirect economic benefit may be regarded as exhibiting pro-social behavior. 
However, the broader issue of climate change – typically linked to carbon emissions - has become 
an increasingly important economic issue for companies due to several reasons. First, current and future 
expected regulations around the world would aim to limit the carbon footprint of corporations by either 
imposing a direct Pigovian tax on carbon emissions or by instituting cap-and-trade programs. In the 
former case, a firm pays a certain price for every ton of carbon emissions it generates during the course of 
its operations. In the latter case, corporations are allowed to emit carbon up to a certain amount, and if 
they exceed that amount then they need to buy carbon emission allowances in the market place. Both 
mechanisms increase operating costs in proportion to the amount of carbon emissions.  
Another reason why carbon emission has become an important economic issue is because of the 
rapidly shifting social expectations regarding the environmental performance of corporations. Good 
environmental performance, including but not limited to a smaller carbon footprint, may be rewarded in 
the product, labor, and capital markets. Since customers, employees, and investors increasingly demand 
from companies to take measures to address climate change and limit their carbon emissions, firms with 
better environmental performance have more loyal and satisfied customers, who want to buy “greener” 
                                                            
1 In the presence of negative externalities, the social cost of a market activity is not covered by the private cost of the 
activity, which could lead to an inefficient market and over-consumption of the product or resource. A Pigovian tax 
equal to the negative externality is thought to correct the market outcome back to efficiency. 
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products” (Bhattacharya and Sen 2004), more engaged and satisfied employees, who want to work for a 
“greener” employer (Turban and Greening 1996), and face lower capital constraints since investors are 
building future carbon prices into their valuation decisions (Cheng, Ioannou, and Serafeim 2011). 
However, currently these market forces are pushing companies to only partially internalize the negative 
externalities of carbon emissions since the consequences of climate change are not yet equally understood 
by all stakeholders. In fact, such market imperfections are the reason why “carbon markets” have not yet 
been established. 
Moreover, the partial internalization of the negative externality generates ambiguity at the level of 
the employees with regards to how tasks aimed at reducing carbon emissions will be perceived. On the 
one hand, if reducing carbon emissions is integrated as part of business strategy, then employees are more 
likely to perceive the associated tasks and efforts as part of their “regular” job responsibilities to support 
the economic interests of the firm. If, on the other hand, reducing carbon emissions is perceived as “doing 
good” for others (i.e., voluntarily dealing with the externality) at  a short-term cost to the company and its 
investors, then employees will be more likely to perceive the tasks focused on carbon emissions as an 
expression of pro-social behavior, taking place in addition to their “regular” job responsibilities. Thus, 
regardless of the underlying motives at the company level for introducing an incentive scheme for 
reducing carbon emissions, the critical issue is understanding employees’ motivation for reducing carbon 
emissions.  
The academic literature includes many studies that have explored the effectiveness of monetary 
vs. nonmonetary incentives, in fields as diverse as economics, psychology, managerial accounting, 
education, and more. Within economics, agency theory studies the effect of monetary incentives on 
individual performance, arguing that monetary incentives are employed in order to align the principal’s 
objectives with those of the agent’s. Thus, the optimal contract is essentially a trade-off between risk 
sharing between the employee and the firm and incentive provisions, provided that the strength of the 
monetary incentives should be decreasing in proportion to the noise of the performance measures upon 
which the contract is based (Holmstrom 1979, Banker and Datar 1989). Empirical research on the effect 8 
 
of such monetary incentive contracts (i.e., pay-for-performance contracts) finds that individuals respond 
to monetary incentives either by working harder or by self-selecting into those pay-for-performance jobs 
that are the best match for their own ability level (Lazear, 2000). In psychology, the behavioral school 
also argues that monetary incentives have a positive effect on motivation by providing positive 
reinforcement, which in turn increases the frequency of the rewarded behaviors and results in enhanced 
performance (Skinner 1953).  
However, monetary incentives may also induce distorted behaviors either through the individual’s 
misallocation of efforts into task dimensions that are easier to quantify and generate performance pay 
(Milgrom and Holmstrom 1991), or through the crowding-out of intrinsic motivation. More specifically, 
cognitive evaluation theory (CET) argues that people perform a given task  driven by intrinsic motivation 
(e.g., playing a game could be fun in itself even without getting paid or getting praise), asserting that such 
an intrinsic motivation originates from the psychological need for autonomy and competence. 
Accordingly, the effects of an incentive scheme or a reward depend on how it affects the perceived self-
determination and the perceived competence of the individual. Therefore, rewards or incentives may be 
interpreted by individuals primarily as being external controllers of their behavior or as being indicators 
of their competence. In the former case, the theory argues, rewards or incentives are predicted to thwart 
the need for autonomy and, therefore, to undermine intrinsic motivation. In the latter case however, when 
rewards are positively informational, they satisfy the individual’s need for recognition of her competence 
and thus result in enhanced intrinsic motivation (Deci et al. 1999). Employees may take actions to reduce 
carbon emissions because they choose to do something that makes them feel good, in which case a bonus 
plan might take that sense of autonomy away by making people feel that they are now paid or required to 
do so. Alternatively, employees may take carbon emissions reduction actions precisely because they 
consider such actions as their formal job functions they are paid to perform, in which case a bonus might 
be a quite effective tool to enhance job performance. Thus the question is whether reducing carbon 
emissions is perceived by the employee as intrinsically-motivation driven, either due to demonstrating the 9 
 
exercise of autonomy or individual competence, or is based on external controls exercised on the 
individual’s behavior. 
The nature of the incentivized behavior – i.e., whether economically instrumental or pro-social 
can be a major determinant of the relative effectiveness of monetary vs. nonmonetary incentives. 
Relatedly, Benabou and Tirole (2006) develop a theory of pro-social behavior where the individual’s 
behavior reflects an endogenous and unobservable mix of three motivations: intrinsic, extrinsic, and 
reputational motivation. Intrinsic motivation is the innate satisfaction accruing to the individual regardless 
of perceptions by others. Reputational motivation is the satisfaction accruing to the individual from 
positive perceptions others have of him or her. In our analysis, monetary incentives would fall under the 
category of extrinsic motivation, while nonmonetary incentives would fall under the category of intrinsic 
or reputational motivation. Furthermore, they find that the presence of extrinsic incentives diminishes the 
intrinsic value associated with performing good deeds, and therefore creating doubt regarding the extent 
to which such deeds were performed because of their benefit to the social good or because of the 
monetary incentives themselves. Furthermore, publicity and disclosure (e.g., public recognition) further 
strengthen the signaling motive in their model of pro-social behavior.  
A large number of experimental as well as archival studies found empirical results that are 
consistent with these theoretical predictions. For example, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a) conducted an 
experiment with Israeli day care providers, finding that when they instituted a fine for parents picking 
their children up late, late pickups in fat increased. Essentially, the fine was seen as a fee, an instrumental 
economic incentive, which parents could decide to pay and assuage any moral resistance to non-
compliance. Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) found that monetary incentives decreased the acceptance 
rate among citizens of a local community about whether a nuclear waste repository should have been 
located in their town. Kunreuther et al.  (1990) found similar results for the siting of a nuclear repository 
in Nevada, where raising tax rebates failed to increase support for the project since they signaled the 
opposite of pro-social behavior. Gneezy and Rustichini (2000b) showed that for a group of pupils 
collecting donations for charity from households, only those groups that received substantial monetary 10 
 
rewards did as well as the groups that worked for free. All other groups that received moderate monetary 
rewards underperformed. 
These studies that have explored the effectiveness of monetary vs. nonmonetary incentives have 
been conducted at the level of the individual by examining the effect of incentives on individual 
performance.  The overall empirical and experimental evidence seem to point to mixed effects of 
monetary (nonmonetary) incentives depending on the nature of the tasks involved. The general lessons 
that can be drawn from this body of research are that monetary (nonmonetary) incentives tend to be less 
(more) effective when tasks are perceived as pro-social behavior (economically instrumental) motives. 
We conduct our analysis on firm-level by examining the effectiveness of monetary vs. 
nonmonetary incentives on carbon emissions. On an aggregate level, we have no a priori predictions on 
the effectiveness of monetary incentives vs. nonmonetary incentives since we have no a priori knowledge 
on whether employees within the sample firms perceive reducing carbon emissions as pro-social behavior 
or not. However, we hypothesize that monetary incentives are less effective in reducing carbon emissions 
when firms place such monetary incentives on employees who perceive reducing carbon emissions as 
pro-social.  
3.  Sample and Summary Statistics 
We obtain information on firms’ incentive structures regarding climate change management through the 
investor survey of the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP). The investor CDP survey requests information 
on the risks and opportunities of climate change from the world’s largest companies (by market 
capitalization) on behalf of institutional investor signatories (in 2011, there were a total of 551 
institutional investor signatories with a combined $71 trillion in assets under management). The major 
goals of this survey are to provide investors with tools to assess the firms’ climate risk, as well as to help 
firms develop abilities to provide comparable and relevant climate data to their shareholders. In the 2010 
questionnaire, respondents included 84% of the European 300, 82% of the Global 500, 70% of the S&P 11 
 
500, and 74% of the South African 100 companies. See Appendix I for a more complete list of sample 
compositions around the world.  
Starting in 2007, the investor CDP survey asked questions about whether firms provide incentives 
to manage climate change goals (e.g., carbon emission reduction targets), as well as the types of 
incentives provided (whether monetary or nonmonetary).  Over the years, the response rate to these 
particular questions of incentive provision has increased from 76% to over 99% among survey 
participants. See Appendix II for a sample of answers from survey respondents.  
These annual investor CDP surveys, to the best of our knowledge, are the first to provide direct, 
large-scale, cross-sectional data on the types of incentives provided by firms for a specific environmental 
performance dimension that would have otherwise not been available through archival datasets. The 
survey questions are designed to solicit answers on the existence of a particular management practice 
(e.g., yes/no answers), as opposed to answers on cognitive or affective assessment. Therefore, these 
questions are easier for generating more objective answers and are less subject to certain biases in survey 
studies, such as the scaling effects.
2 
We merge the data from all the public responses in investor CDP surveys (2007 to 2010) with the 
Thomson Reuters’ ASSET4 database to provide information on firms’ carbon emissions data, 
sustainability governance structure, and the adoption of climate management policies.
3 After merging the 
datasets, we have a final sample size of 1,683 firm-year observations (794 unique firms). 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics and variable definitions for this sample. We use the natural 
logarithm of carbon emissions and the natural logarithm of carbon emissions scaled by sales as dependent 
variables measuring a firm’s environmental performance. The independent variables of interest are a pair 
                                                            
2 Scale design and anchor choice will influence respondents' ratings, making it difficult to make comparisons across 
respondents.  
3 ASSET4 was a privately held Swiss-based firm (acquired by Thomson Reuters in 2009). The firm collects data and 
scores firms on environmental and social dimensions since 2002. Research analysts of ASSET4 collect more than 
900 evaluation points per firm, where all the primary data used must be objective and publically available. 
Subsequently, these 900 evaluation points are used as inputs to a default equal-weighted framework to calculate 250 
key performance indicators (KPIs) that they further organize into 18 categories within 3 pillars: a) environmental 
performance score, b) social performance score and c) corporate governance score. Every year, a firm receives a z-
score for each of the pillars, benchmarking its performance with the rest of the firms in the database. 
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of indicator variables indicating whether the focal firm provides monetary or nonmonetary incentives 
directly linked to environmental performance.  42.1% of the firm-years are associated with monetary 
incentives, while 18.5% of the firm-years are associated with nonmonetary incentives. The average size 
of the firms in our sample (as measured by sales, employees, or assets) is relatively large due to the 
inclusion criterion (largest firms by market capitalization) in the investor CDP survey. On average, the 
firms in the sample have $8.6 billion in sales, 21 thousand employees, and $16 billion in assets. 
Moreover, 60%, 70%, and 72% of the firm-years have corporate policies to reduce carbon emissions, 
transportation emissions, and supply chain emissions, respectively. Also, 70% of the firm-years are 
associated with the presence of a board committee responsible for sustainability and 65% identify 
commercial risks and opportunities from climate change. Finally, 47% provide an audit opinion on their 
sustainability disclosures. 
Table 2 presents the correlation matrix for the variables considered in our analysis. Monetary 
incentives are positively correlated with carbon emissions scaled by sales, while nonmonetary incentives 
are negatively correlated with carbon emissions scaled by sales. The majority of the control variables 
(those not related to size) are positively correlated with carbon emissions, raising the possibility that these 
variables and the use of monetary incentives may be driven by the same underlying economic and 
technological forces. We use these variables to capture these potentially unobservable factors when 
estimating the effect of monetary and nonmonetary incentives on firms’ environmental performance.  
4.  Results 
Base-line Analysis  
We first estimate the association between the adoption of incentives and carbon emissions by employing 
ordinary least squares (OLS) models that control for year, industry, and country fixed effects. The model 
employed in Table 3 column (1) is:  
(1) Carbon emissionsi,t = α0 + α1 Salesi,t + β1Monetaryi,t  + β2 Nonmonetaryi,t  + Country Fixed 
Effects + Industry Fixed Effects + Year Fixed Effects 13 
 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of carbon emissions. Furthermore, we include a control 
for the scale of operations since the level of emissions is closely linked to the size of a firm’s operations; 
we use the natural logarithm of sales to proxy for size. The independent variables of interest are two 
indicator variables that characterize whether a firm provides monetary or nonmonetary incentives to its 
employees. Table 3 column (1) shows the estimated coefficients and their statistical significance.  
            The model  in  column  (1)  explains  83.3% of the variation in the natural logarithm of carbon 
emissions. The coefficient on Monetary is positive and significant (0.215, t=3.08). In contrast, the 
coefficient on Nonmonetary is negative and marginally significant (-0.141, t=-1.76).  
A potential explanation for the documented association between monetary incentives and the 
level of carbon emissions is that both are correlated with an unobserved third factor. For example, firms 
that make a clear commitment towards reducing their carbon footprint based on a solid business case will 
be more likely to provide monetary incentives but may very well have higher carbon emissions. The 
model in Table 3 column (2) addresses this alternative explanation by including more control variables 
that are likely to contribute to carbon emissions as well as affect the incentive policies.  
(2) Carbon emissionsi,t = α0 + α1 Salesi,t + β1Monetaryi,t   + β2  Nonmonetaryi,t   + γ1 Corporate 
Policiesi,t +  γ2 Business Case for Climate Change Actioni,t + γ3 Sustainability Governancei,t + 
Country Fixed Effects + Industry Fixed Effects + Year Fixed Effects 
We include controls for the adoption of corporate policies to reduce carbon emissions, 
transportation and supply chain emissions, because corporate policies on reducing carbon emissions 
would have a direct effect on a firm’s carbon emission level and also correlates with a firm’s decision of 
providing incentives to reduce carbon emissions. Moreover, we include a control variable for firms that 
discuss in their annual or sustainability report the commercial opportunities and risks caused by climate 
change since such firms have a business case for climate change actions and are thus more likely to be 
affected by forces in the operating environment that both impact their carbon emissions and their 
incentive provisions on carbon emissions. Also, to capture the firm’s sustainability governance structure, 
we include controls for the commitment of the company towards sustainability, the presence of a board 14 
 
committee for sustainability, and a control for whether the firm undertakes an audit of its sustainability 
report.  
Table 3 column (2) shows that the coefficients on Monetary and Nonmonetary remain positive 
and negative, respectively. Both are significant but the magnitude of the coefficient for monetary 
incentives somewhat decreases suggesting that this alternative explanation partly drives the association 
between  Monetary and Emissions. All else equal, firms that provide monetary incentives have 17.8 
percent higher emissions and firms that provide nonmonetary incentives have 14.6 percent lower 
emissions compared to firms that provide no carbon emission incentives at all. 
Another potential explanation for the association between incentives and emissions is that we 
have imperfectly controlled for the scale of the firm’s operations.  To address this concern we include 
additional controls including the natural logarithm of the company’s total assets and number of 
employees.  
(3) Carbon emissionsi,t = α0 + α1 Salesi,t + α2  Employeesi,t  +  α3  Assetsi,t  +  β1Monetaryi,t   + β2 
NonMonetaryi,t  + γ1 Corporate Policiesi,t +  γ2 Business Case for Climate Change Actioni,t + γ3 
Sustainability Governancei,t  + Country Fixed Effects + Industry Fixed Effects + Year Fixed 
Effects 
Column (3) shows that the results do not significantly change. All three scale variables load with 
a positive and significant coefficient, as expected. Moreover, when we alternatively use the natural 
logarithm of carbon emissions over sales as the dependent variable, our results effectively remain the 
same. Table 4, column (1) shows that the coefficient on Monetary is positive and significant (0.169, 
t=2.59) while the coefficient on Nonmonetary is negative and significant (-0.154, t=-1.99). 
An additional concern is that we have inadequately controlled for industry membership by 
including 64 indicator variables; a more fine classification might be necessary.  In column (2) of Table 4 
we use an alternative industry classification that generates instead 104 indicator variables. Both 
coefficients of interest remain significant. The coefficient on Monetary is positive and significant (0.131, 
t=1.99) while the coefficient on Nonmonetary is negative and significant (-0.136, t= -1.97). 15 
 
A similar concern is that fixed effects are inadequately controlling for systematic shifts at the 
country or/and industry level in emission activity. To control for this effect, we introduce 130 time-
varying country and 281 time-varying industry effects. A disadvantage of this approach is that 
introducing such a large number of indicator variables reduces the power of the statistical test. Column 
(3) shows that the coefficient on Monetary remains positive and significant.   The coefficient on 
Nonmonetary remains negative, though it becomes insignificant.  
 
Firm Fixed Effects Model and Matching Analysis  
In Table 5 we introduce firm fixed effects in the specification to isolate any time-invariant firm-specific 
effects that might be creating a spurious correlation between the independent variables of interest and the 
dependent variable.  
(4) Carbon emissionsi,t = α0 + α1 Salesi,t + β1Monetaryi,t   + β2  NonMonetaryi,t   + γ1 Corporate 
Policiesi,t +  γ2 Business Case for Climate Change Actioni,t + γ3 Sustainability Governancei,t + 
Firm Fixed Effects + Country-year Fixed Effects + Industry-year Fixed Effects 
The disadvantage of this approach is that the statistical power is significantly impaired because 
we do not have data for a long time-series available for each firm. We estimate this model using only 906 
observations for 275 firms that individually have at least three observations. In column (1) of Table 5 the 
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of emissions while in column (2) it is the natural logarithm of 
emissions over sales. The results from these models are similar to the results of Tables 3 and 4 but, as 
expected, they are statistically weaker. Column (1) suggests that firms that provide monetary incentives 
have 7.1 percent higher emissions and firms that provide nonmonetary incentives have 9.9 percent lower 
emissions compared to firms that provide no incentives. Column (2) suggests that firms that provide 
monetary incentives have 11.3 percent higher emissions and firms that provide nonmonetary incentives 
have 12.8 percent lower emissions compared to firms that provide no incentives. These findings increase 
our confidence towards arguing that it is incentives that lead to the change in emissions rather than other 
factors. 16 
 
Table 6 reinforces the findings of Table 5 by showing the results of an analysis on a matched 
sample of firms. There are 103 units (firm-years) that switched from no incentive to monetary incentives 
only from year t-1 to year t. We label this group as the “treatment group.” There are also 401 units 
providing no incentives from year t-1 to year t, which we label as the “control group.”
4 We first take all 
the units in the treatment group, and match each unit with two units in the control group that have: 1) 
exactly the same industry membership; 2) the closest value in carbon emissions scaled by sales in year t-
1
5. Then we measure emissions over sales in years t and t+1 to examine whether the treatment group that 
starts providing monetary incentives experiences an increase in emissions relative to the control group. 
Panel A of Table 6 shows the difference between treatment and control group for 185 pairs in years t-1 
and t. The matching procedure appears to be working effectively since there is no statistical difference in 
emissions between the treatment and control group in year t-1. In contrast, emissions are actually higher 
for the treatment group in year t. The differences-in-differences estimate is 0.122 and significant at the 5 
percent level. The results remain statistically significant when we consider emissions at year t+1 (Panel 
B).  
 
Interaction Effects between Incentive Types and the Perceived Task Nature  
As discussed in section 3, reduction of carbon emissions may also be conceptualized as pro-social 
behavior. Our findings are consistent with this idea by suggesting that monetary incentives might not only 
be ineffective but also detrimental in terms of task performance. In other words, monetary incentives may 
well crowd out intrinsic and reputational motivation for reducing carbon emissions. To provide more 
direct evidence of this mechanism, we generate interaction terms between the type of incentives provided 
                                                            
4 Among the 103 (401) units in the treatment (treatment) group, 2 (6) units miss emission variables for year t-1; 4 
(11) units miss emission variables for year t; and 63 (204) units miss emission variables for year t+1.  
5 The reason that we choose from the control group two matching units for a treatment unit is because it offers the 
benefit of not relying on too little information without incorporating observations that are not sufficiently similar. 
And the fact that we have more control units than treatment units can afford us the opportunity of providing more 
than 1 matching unit. Some of the treatment units only find one control unit that meets the above criteria (hence we 
adjust the weight of such units to make every treatment unit carry the same weight).  
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and the type of formal position that the incentivized employee occupies.  In this respect, we argue that for 
employees whose job description specifically and directly includes environmental responsibilities, it 
would be less likely that monetary incentives will crowd out pro-social behavior  (in contrast to senior 
executives, board members, geographic subsidiaries, or business unit managers). Exactly because of the 
nature of the position and the formally assigned responsibility, tasks or actions related to the environment, 
and environmental performance more broadly, would be considered as part of the typical contractual 
arrangement between the firm and the employee and, therefore, they would be perceived as legitimate for 
economically-instrumental reasons and not as based on pro-social behavior. In other words, the effect of 
monetary incentives on carbon emissions is likely to be mitigated when these incentives are provided to 
employees with assigned responsibility for environmental performance. The model used for this test is:  
(5) Carbon emissionsi,t = α0 + α1 Salesi,t + β1Monetaryi,t  + β2 Nonmonetaryi,t  +  β3 Environmental 
Positioni,t  +  β4  Monetaryi,t  * Environmental Positioni,t + β5 Nonmonetaryi,t  * Environmental 
Positioni,t + γ1 Corporate Policiesi,t +  γ2  Business Case for Climate Change Actioni,t  +  γ3 
Sustainability Governancei,t  + Country Fixed Effects + Industry Fixed Effects + Year Fixed 
Effects 
“Environmental Position” is an indicator variable that equals to one if the firm provides 
incentives to employees in positions directly responsible for environmental performance. In our sample, 
27 percent of the total observations (i.e. across incentive types) and 55 percent of those providing 
monetary incentives offer these incentives to employees in roles and positions related to environmental 
performance. The results in Table 7 support our prediction. The coefficient on the interaction term 
between Monetary incentives and Environmental Position (an indicator variable that takes the value of 
one if the incentives are provided to employees with climate change relevant roles) is negative and 
significant when the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of carbon emissions (-0.393, t=-2.78) or 
the natural logarithm of carbon emissions over sales (-0.385, t=-2.74). 
 
Two-stage Multinomial Logistic Model  18 
 
Up to this point, we have discussed and empirically documented a statistically significant relationship 
between both monetary (negative association) and nonmonetary (positive association) incentives and 
reducing carbon emissions. Yet there is clearly an underlying selection issue that we still need to address: 
not all firms choose to provide employee incentives that are linked to environmental performance, and 
some may even provide both monetary and nonmonetary incentives to achieve their environmental goals 
(i.e., the adoption of an incentive scheme is not random as an experimental research design would 
dictate). In other words, we need to explicitly account for a first stage in which a focal firm decides 
whether or not to adopt some type of incentive scheme since doing so will allow us to address any 
potential selection bias in our findings. The existing literature on the issue of antecedents to pro-social 
behavior (e.g. Bansal & Roth, 2000; Aguilera et al. 2007; Sharma & Starik, 2002) argues that firms are 
driven towards engaging in socially responsible activities, such as the reduction of carbon emissions, by: 
a) potentially profitable economic opportunities, b) legitimacy seeking activities, typically resulting from 
institutional pressures and c) ethical, moral and/or normative concerns. Potentially profitable economic 
opportunities equates to economic instrumentality. Legitimacy-seeking activities equates to the 
reputational benefits of pro-social behaviour. Ethical, moral, and/or normative concerns equates to the 
intrinsic motivation aspect of pro-social behaviour.  Accordingly, such motives may be classified in three 
distinct categories: economic (or instrumental) motives, reputational (or institutional) motives and ethical 
(or moral) motives (Aguilera et al. 2007; Bansal & Roth, 2000; Bronn & Vidaver-Cohen, 2009; Massa, 
2012).   
We argue that the adoption or not of an incentive scheme that aims to reduce carbon emissions 
will also be driven by these categories of motivation, economic, reputational, and ethical and therefore we 
propose a first stage multinomial logistic specification, modeling four distinct choices: a) no adoption, b) 
adoption of nonmonetary incentives only, c) adoption of monetary incentives only and d) adoption of 
both monetary and nonmonetary incentives.   
First stage model:  Probability (Incentive typei,t) = α0 + α1 Economic Motivesit + α2 Reputational Motiveit  
+ α3 Ethical Motivesit  19 
 
“Incentive Type” is a firm’s actual choice from the aforementioned four choices. “Economic 
(reputational or ethical) Motives” represent variables that proxy for a firm’s tendency to adopt incentive 
plans to reduce carbon emissions due to economic (reputational or ethical) motives. For all categories, we 
include several controls in order to capture as comprehensively as possible the three categories of motives 
discussed above. In particular, firms that are larger (Sales) may be more likely to adopt an incentive 
scheme since due to their scale of operations they are better positioned to realize efficiency gains or cost 
reductions linked to reducing carbon emissions (i.e., more likely to be motivated by economic 
opportunities). The size of a firm is also likely to affect its reputational concerns due to its visibility in a 
business environment. In addition, firms that specifically explore Commercial Opportunities/Risks 
associated with sustainability as indicated by their public disclosures would be more likely to adopt an 
incentive scheme since they are structurally better positioned to understand and explore economic 
opportunities linked to carbon emissions. We also include “Bonus Plan” as a control variable for 
economic motives to adopt a certain incentive plan since whether a firm already has a performance-based 
bonus plan reflects a firm’s belief in the effectiveness of monetary incentives as well as the difficulty of 
implementing an incentive plan.  
Moreover, we proxy for a firm’s reputational motives or institutional pressures for legitimacy that 
a firm may be facing (e.g., mimetic pressures) by calculating the percentage of other firms in any given 
country-year pair that have adopted monetary or nonmonetary incentives (% monetary incentives for the 
country-year and % nonmonetary incentives for the country-year).  
We control for firms’ ethical motives which will be perceived as pro-social by its employees in 
several ways. First, we argue that if a focal firm has been an early (pre-2002) signatory of the UN Global 
Compact (Join UN Global Compact by 2002) it did so based on ethical or reputational (rather than 
economic) motives and therefore we include an indicator variable as a predictor for incentive scheme 
adoption. Second, we argue that firms that have adopted a range of corporate policies that characterize a 
strong underlying sustainability culture (Eccles et. al, 2011) will also be more likely to adopt an incentive 
scheme linked to carbon emissions. Therefore, we control for a corporate policy to Reduce carbon 20 
 
emissions, to Reduce transportation emissions, and to Reduce supply chain emissions. Finally, firms that 
have a Sustainability Committee or perform a Sustainability Audit and are therefore relatively more 
transparent and credible with regards to their sustainability initiatives, and thus exhibit a stronger 
commitment towards this goal, will also be more likely to adopt incentive schemes linked to carbon 
emissions.  
Panel A of Table 8 presents the results of the first stage multinomial logistic specification. In the 
first stage selection model, the probability of adopting a monetary (nonmonetary) incentive scheme is 
positively and significantly associated with the percentage of other firms in any given country-year pair 
that have adopted monetary (nonmonetary) incentives. The size of a firm, the existence of a sustainability 
committee, a bonus plan, and a corporate policy of reducing carbon emissions, as well as whether the firm 
is an early adopter of UN Global Compact, are all positively and significantly associated with the 
adoption of a monetary incentive scheme. That is to say, a larger firm that has established sustainability 
governance structure, carbon emissions reduction policy, and an existing bonus plan and that has joined 
UN Global Compact early is most likely to adopt a monetary incentive scheme. The adoption of both 
monetary and non-monetary incentive schemes is also positively and significantly related to the size of a 
firm and the existence of a bonus plan. In addition, a firm that has assessed the commercial opportunities 
and risks associated with carbon emissions is also more likely to adopt both incentive schemes. 
Panel B of Table 8 presents the second stage results from an OLS regression where we control for 
the estimated (from the first stage) probability of adopting a specific type of incentive, in addition to 
country, industry and year fixed effects.  Second stage model:  
Carbon emissionsi,t = α0 + α1 Salesi,t + β1Monetaryi,t  + β2 Nonmonetaryi,t  +  β3 Both Monetary and 
Nonmonetaryi,t + β4  Predicted Probability of Adopting a Certain Incentive Type (from first stage) + γ1 
Corporate Policiesi,t +  γ2 Business Case for Climate Change Actioni,t + γ3 Sustainability Governancei,t + 
γ4 Other Control Variables Used in the First Stage + Country Fixed Effects + Industry Fixed Effects + 
Year Fixed Effects 21 
 
In the second stage analysis, consistent with our previous results, we find that the exclusive 
adoption of monetary incentives significantly increases carbon emissions, whereas we find directionally 
consistent but insignificant results for nonmonetary incentives. Moreover, we find no effect on carbon 
emissions by the concurrent adoption of both monetary and nonmonetary incentives, suggesting a 
potential “cancel-out” of opposite effects from monetary and nonmonetary incentives. The coefficients on 
the control variables are similar to those in baseline regressions. Notice that the predicted probability of 
providing monetary incentives (calculated from the first stage) is positively and significantly associated 
with carbon emissions, indicating that there indeed exists a selection bias at least in the group that adopts 
monetary incentives (i.e. those who have a higher probability of adopting monetary incentives also have 
higher carbon emissions). Therefore, our additional tests to address those selection issues (through 
matching and two-stage selection model) are worthwhile.  
Future research may seek to gain a deeper understanding of why this is the case by employing 
more fine grained data describing, for example, the relative share of monetary vs. nonmonetary incentives 
within an organization and also by exploring how different incentive schemes may be more or less 
effective if provided to different positions within an organizational hierarchy.   
5.  Conclusion 
While past research has demonstrated that reducing carbon emissions and exhibiting good environmental 
performance is important for corporations, to the best of our knowledge no study has investigated the 
mechanisms of how these environmental goals may be achieved at a micro level within organizations. In 
this paper, we characterize and assess the effectiveness of different types of incentive schemes that 
corporations have adopted to incentivize behavior by their employees towards reducing carbon emissions. 
Our results show that contrary to the belief in the “seriousness” and effectiveness of monetary incentives 
on reducing carbon emissions, the adoption of monetary incentives is associated with higher carbon 
emissions. In contrast, the use of nonmonetary incentives is associated with lower carbon emissions. 
These results hold in cross-sectional analyses where we control for the size of the corporation, adoption of 
corporate policies to reduce emissions, the presence of commercial risks and opportunities due to climate 22 
 
change, and the quality of the organization’s sustainability governance. Moreover, we find the same result 
when we introduce firm fixed effects and we use in the identification only within-firm variation or when 
we use a matched sample and we track carbon emissions over time. Importantly, we also find support for 
our results –directionally consistent but not significant for nonmonetary incentives – when we control for 
potential selection bias by explicitly accounting for the factors that may drive the decision of an 
organization of whether or not to adopt any incentive system at all aimed at reducing carbon emissions. 
These results suggest that under some conditions (i.e., when employees perceive their action as 
pro-social behavior) the adoption of nonmonetary incentives might be more effective in reducing carbon 
emissions compared to monetary incentives. However, as in any non-laboratory analysis where the 
treatment effect is non-randomly applied, it is difficult to identify the causal effect. While it is 
conceivable that an unobservable factor exists that is positively correlated with monetary incentives, 
negatively correlated with nonmonetary incentives, and positively correlated with carbon emissions, we 
have not been able to identify such a factor. An alternative explanation is that reverse causality, at least 
with respect to monetary incentives, is generating our findings. In other words, firms that provide 
monetary incentives have higher carbon emissions. The analysis where we introduce firm fixed-effects 
partially addresses this concern and suggests that within the same firm, after the introduction of monetary 
incentives, carbon emissions increase relative to firms that do not provide monetary incentives. Moreover, 
the two-stage multinomial logistic model that we present yields results consistent with our initial 
analyses, at least with regard to monetary incentives, and suggests that any potential selection bias may 
not be as severe. A slightly different alternative explanation that introduces more complexity is that firms 
that have higher carbon emissions and that expect their carbon emissions to increase in the future years 
provide monetary incentives.  
We recognize a number of other caveats related to our work. Our sample is comprised of large 
predominantly multinational organizations. It is possible that the effects documented here do not obtain 
for small firms that are competing only locally. Moreover, we have been able to examine only four years 
of data. It could well be that analyzing data over a longer time horizon may produce somewhat different 23 
 
results if there is a time lag between the introduction of incentive systems and their eventual effect. We 
believe that all of these issues are fruitful areas for future research. 
Still, this study raises an important practical question. The practical question is what is the best 
way for a firm to explain the voluntary adoption of a carbon reduction program and its related incentives? 
The economically instrumental argument is most palatable to investors and begs for a matching incentive 
scheme in order to be perceived as “real” rather than “greenwashing.” Ironically, though, the associated 
monetary incentives may actually be counterproductive except for these few employees whose jobs are 
directly focused on energy efficiency and the reduction of carbon emissions. The firm’s explanation of its 
motives as normative in support of pro-social behavior, reinforced by nonmonetary incentive schemes for 
all other employees, may be more effective in reducing carbon emissions.   
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Variable Definitions 
Variable Variable  Definition  Observations Mean Std.  Dev. 
carbon emissions 
Natural logarithm of carbon emissions  
(scope 1 and 2 as measured in tons) 
1,683 13.258  2.387 
carbon emissions scaled by 
sales 
Natural logarithm of carbon emissions  
(scope 1 and 2 as measured in tons) over sales 
1,683 4.196  2.040 
Monetary 
An indicator variable that equals to 1 if the firm provides 
monetary incentives in that year 
1,683 0.421  0.494 
Nonmonetary 
An indicator variable that equals to 1 if the firm provides 
non-monetary incentives in that year 
1,683 0.185  0.388 
Sales 
Natural logarithm of sales  
(measured in million USDs) 
1,683 9.062  1.449 
Employees  Natural logarithm of number of employees   1,602  9.945  1.525 
Assets 
Natural logarithm of assets  
(measured in million USDs) 
1,683 9.692  1.661 
Reduce carbon emissions 
An indicator variable that equals to 1 if the firm has a policy 
to reduce carbon emissions 
1,683 0.596  0.491 
Sustainability committee 
An indicator variable that equals to 1 if the firm has a 
sustainability committee on the board 
1,683 0.704  0.457 
Commercial 
opportunities/risks 
An indicator variable that equals to 1 if the firm has assessed 
commercial opportunities/risks related to climate change 
1,683 0.647  0.478 
Reduce transportation 
emissions 
An indicator variable that equals to 1 if the firm has a policy 
to reduce carbon emissions related to transportation 
1,683 0.694  0.461 
Reduce supply chain emissions 
An indicator variable that equals to 1 if the firm has a policy 
to reduce carbon emissions from its supply chain 
1,683 0.720  0.449 
Sustainability audit 
An indicator variable that equals to 1 if the firm has its 
sustainability performance measures externally audited 
1,683 0.473  0.499 
Environmental positions 
An indicator variable that equals to 1 if the firm provides 
incentives to employees in positions responsible for 
environmental performance. 
1,659 0.269  0.443 
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
  
I  II III IV V VI  VIII  IX X XI  XII  XIII  XIV  XV 
carbon  emissions  1.000 
             
 
carbon  emissions scaled by 
sales 
0.806 1.000 
            
 
Monetary  0.187 0.102 1.000 
           
 
Nonmonetary  0.038 -0.018 0.287 1.000 
          
 
Sales  0.529 -0.076 0.168 0.089 1.000 
         
 
Employees  0.432 -0.072 0.150 0.084 0.831 1.000 
        
 
Assets  0.323 -0.181 0.149 0.067 0.803 0.568 1.000 
       
 
Reduce carbon  emissions  0.374 0.291 0.175 0.108 0.213 0.158 0.079 1.000 
      
 
Sustainability committee  0.168 0.076 0.238 0.142 0.175 0.143 0.186 0.168 1.000 
     
 
Commercial opportunities/risks  0.152 0.067 0.117 0.007 0.159 0.125 0.185 0.110 0.149 1.000 
   
 
Reduce transportation 
emissions 
-0.059  -0.180 0.105 0.103 0.159 0.181 0.111 0.225 0.123 0.053 1.000 
  
 
Reduce supply chain emissions  0.053 -0.087 0.196 0.107 0.213 0.217 0.174 0.278 0.234 0.153 0.305 1.000 
 
 
Sustainability audit  0.169 0.071 0.174 0.081 0.184 0.135 0.205 0.184 0.201 0.137 0.098 0.215  1.000   
Environmental positions  0.082 -0.011 0.547 0.336 0.154 0.151 0.176 0.122 0.163 0.128 0.113 0.155  0.104  1.000 
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Table 3: Incentives and Carbon Emissions 
 
  Carbon emissions 
(1) (2) (3) 
  Coefficient t-stat. Coefficient t-stat. Coefficient t-stat. 
Incentives        
   Monetary   0.215 3.08
a  0.178 2.72
a  0.178 2.87
a 
   Nonmonetary  -0.141 -1.76
c  -0.146 -1.88
c  -0.142 -1.93
c 
        
Scale        
   Sales  1.004  31.14
a  0.964 26.23
a  0.242 2.29
b 
   Employees       0.467 4.63a 
   Assets       0.369 4.90
a 
        
Corporate Policies        
   Reduce carbon emissions     0.345 3.68
a  0.291 3.01
a 
   Reduce transportation emissions     -0.171 -1.87
c  -0.165 -1.76
c 
   Reduce supply chain emissions     -0.176 -2.07
b  -0.190 -2.35
b 
        
Business case for climate change action        
   Commercial opportunities/risks     0.076 1.11 0.044 0.66 
        
Sustainability Governance        
   Sustainability committee     0.134 1.62 0.081 1.08 
   Sustainability audit     0.267 3.48
a  0.236 3.17
a 
Intercept  5.839 11.61 5.813 12.07 4.010 7.46 
         
Country fixed effects  Yes    Yes    Yes   
Industry fixed effects  Yes    Yes    Yes   
Year fixed effects  Yes    Yes    Yes   
Adj  R-squared  83.3%  84.0%  85.7%  
N   1,683    1,683    1,602   
 
(1): OLS regression using Sales as a proxy for scale; (2): OLS regression controlling for corporate policies, business 
case for climate change action, and sustainability governance; (3) OLS regression using number of employees 
(Employees) and Assets as additional proxies for scale. All OLS regressions control for country fixed effects, 
industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of carbon emissions. 
a. p<0.01; b. p<0.05; c. p<0.10  28 
 
Table 4: Incentives and Carbon Emissions – Robustness tests 
  Carbon emissions/ sales        Carbon emissions        Carbon emissions 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Coefficient t-stat.  Coefficient t-stat.  Coefficient  t-stat. 
Incentives         
   Monetary   0.169 2.59
a 0.131 1.99
b  0.185 2.63
a
   Nonmonetary  -0.154 -1.99
b -0.136 -1.97
b  -0.107 -1.21
         
Scale         
   Sales      0.083  0.81  0.284  2.56
b
   Employees      0.563  7.07
a  0.442 4.19
a
   Assets      0.397  4.74
a  0.345 4.28
a
         
Corporate Policies         
   Reduce carbon emissions  0.338  3.66
a 0.197 2.43
b  0.338 3.14
a
   Reduce transportation emissions  -0.173  -1.88
c -0.148 -1.67
c  -0.173 -1.65
c
   Reduce supply chain emissions  -0.191  -2.36
b -0.158 -1.87
c  -0.182 -2.00
b
         
Business case for climate change action         
   Commercial opportunities/risks  0.070  1.03  0.040  0.60  0.062  0.83 
         
Sustainability Governance         
   Sustainability committee  0.122  1.51  0.075  0.97  0.102  1.21 
   Sustainability audit  0.253  3.34
a 0.264 3.44
a  0.233 2.82
a
Intercept 5.578  12.88  4.083  8.28  3.811  6.30 
            
Country fixed effects  Yes    Yes    No   
Industry fixed effects  Yes    No    No   
Year fixed effects  Yes    Yes    No   
Subsector fixed effects  No    Yes    No   
Country-year fixed effects  No    No    Yes   
Industry-year fixed effects  No    No    Yes   
Adj R-squared  78.1%    86.3%    84.6%   
N 1,683    1,602    1,602   
 
(1): OLS regression using the natural logarithm of carbon emissions scaled by sales as the dependent variable; (2) 
OLS regression using the natural logarithm of carbon emissions as the dependent variable and controlling for 
subsector fixed effects by using a finer classification of industry; (3) OLS regression using the natural logarithm of 
carbon emissions as the dependent variable and controlling for country-year fixed effects and industry-year fixed 
effects.  
a. p<0.01; b. p<0.05; c. p<0.10   29 
 
Table 5: Incentives and carbon Emissions – Within Firm Estimates 
 Carbon  emissions   
(1) 
Carbon emissions/sales 
(2) 
  Coefficient t-stat.  Coefficient  t-stat. 
Incentives       
   Monetary   0.071 1.64 0.113  2.29
a
   Nonmonetary  -0.099 -1.39 -0.128  -1.57 
       
Scale       
   Sales  0.117  0.83     
       
Corporate Policies       
   Reduce carbon emissions  0.042  0.43  0.060  0.58 
   Reduce transportation emissions  -0.122  -1.17  -0.089  -0.77 
   Reduce supply chain emissions  0.079  1.10  0.096  1.30 
       
Business case for climate change action       
   Commercial opportunities/risks  0.091  0.76  0.149  1.18 
       
Sustainability Governance       
   Sustainability committee  0.000  0.00  -0.018  -0.25 
   Sustainability audit  0.187  1.47  0.193  1.33 
        
Firm fixed effects  Yes    Yes   
Country-year fixed effects  Yes    Yes   
Industry-year fixed effects  Yes    Yes   
Adj R-squared  97.8%    98.6%   
N   906    906   
 
(1): OLS regression using the natural logarithm of carbon emissions as the dependent variable and controlling for 
firm fixed effects; (2): OLS regression using the natural logarithm of carbon emissions scaled by sales as the 
dependent variable and controlling for firm fixed effects. 
a. p<0.01; b. p<0.05; c. p<0.10 
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Table 6: Incentives and carbon Emissions Scaled by Sales – Matched Sample 
Panel A: Effect in year t 
 Diff=Treatment-Control  p-value 
t-1 0.021  0.676 
t 0.143  0.028 
Diffs-in-diffs  0.122 0.046
b 
 
Panel B: Effect in year t+1 
  Diff=Treatment-Control p-value 
t-1 -0.080  0.504 
t+1 0.355  0.057 
Diffs-in-diffs  0.435 0.049
b 
 
Panel A shows the differences in the natural logarithm of carbon emissions scaled by sales in year t-1 and year t 
between the treatment group and its matched sample of control units (matched by exact industry and the closest 
values of carbon emissions scaled by sales in year t-1). 
Panel B shows the differences in the natural logarithm of carbon emissions scaled by sales in year t-1 and year t+1 
between the treatment group and its matched sample of control units (matched by exact industry and the closest 
values of carbon emissions scaled by sales in year t-1). 
a. p<0.01; b. p<0.05; c. p<0.10 
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Table 7: Incentives and carbon Emissions – Employee type 
  Carbon emissions  
(1) 
Carbon emissions/sales 
(2) 
  Coefficient t-stat.  Coefficient  t-stat. 
Incentives       
   Monetary   0.288 3.50
a 0.278 3.39
a
   Nonmonetary  -0.223 -2.12
a -0.227 -2.18
a
       
   Environmental Position  0.243  1.94
c 0.231 1.86
c
   Monetary * Environmental Position  -0.393 -2.78
a -0.385 -2.74
a
   Nonmonetary * Environmental Position  0.101 0.76  0.098  0.74 
       
Scale       
   Sales  0.961  26.05
a   
       
Corporate Policies       
   Reduce carbon emissions  0.355  3.75
a 0.347 3.73
a
   Reduce transportation emissions  -0.174  -1.90
c -0.176 -1.92
c
   Reduce supply chain emissions  -0.181  -2.14
b -0.196 -2.42
b
       
Business case for climate change action       
   Commercial opportunities/risks  0.093  1.35  0.087  1.28 
       
Sustainability Governance       
   Sustainability committee  0.129  1.55  0.116  1.43 
   Sustainability audit  0.267  3.47
a 0.252 3.31
a
Intercept 5.771  11.63  5.521  12.27 
Country fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
Adj R-squared  84.1%  78.3% 
N   1,659  1,659 
 
(1): OLS regression using the natural logarithm of carbon emissions as the dependent variable, with interaction 
terms between the type of incentives (Monetary or Nonmonetary) and Environmental Position; (2): OLS regression 
using the natural logarithm of carbon emissions scaled by sales as the dependent variable, with interaction terms 
between the type of incentives (Monetary or Nonmonetary) and Environmental Position.  
a. p<0.01; b. p<0.05; c. p<0.10 
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Table 8: Panel A – First Step, Multinomial Logistic Regression 
Incentive Type  Firm Motives  Coefficient   t-stat. 
No Incentive    (base outcome)    
Only Non-monetary   
Sales Economic/Reputational  -0.014 -0.13 
Commercial Opportunities/Risks  Economic   0.105 0.36 
Bonus Plan  Economic  0.280 0.93 
% monetary incentives for the country-year  Reputational   0.020 0.02 
% non-monetary incentives for the country-year  Reputational   9.788  10.91
a 
Join UN Global Compact by 2002  Reputational/Ethical  0.523 0.70 
Sustainability Committee  Reputational/Ethical  0.286 0.86 
Sustainability audit  Reputational/Ethical  0.010  0.04 
Reduce carbon emissions  All three  0.472 1.56 
Reduce transportation emissions  All three  0.064 0.20 
Reduce supply chain emissions  All three  -0.297 -0.87 
Intercept    -5.465 -5.03 
Only Monetary      
Sales Economic/Reputational  0.103  1.72
c 
Commercial Opportunities/Risks  Economic   0.173 1.05
 
Bonus Plan  Economic  0.522  2.93
a
% monetary incentives for the country-year  Reputational   5.552  12.36
a 
% non-monetary incentives for the country-year  Reputational   -0.708 -1.47 
Join UN Global Compact by 2002  Reputational/Ethical  0.881  2.60
a 
Sustainability Committee  Reputational/Ethical  0.568  3.02
a 
Sustainability audit  Reputational/Ethical  0.194  1.19
 
Reduce carbon emissions  All three  0.515  3.04
a
Reduce transportation emissions  All three  -0.160 -0.90 
Reduce supply chain emissions  All three  0.091 0.45 
Intercept    -5.103 -8.99 
Both Monetary and Non-monetary      
Sales Economic/Reputational  0.268  3.01
a 
Commercial Opportunities/Risks  Economic   0.594  2.50
b
Bonus Plan  Economic  0.714  2.87
a 
% monetary incentives for the country-year  Reputational   5.646  7.54
a 
% non-monetary incentives for the country-year  Reputational   6.371  10.08
a 
Join UN Global Compact by 2002  Reputational/Ethical  -0.059 -0.11
 
Sustainability Committee  Reputational/Ethical  0.399 1.30 
Sustainability audit  Reputational/Ethical  0.157  0.72 
Reduce carbon emissions  All three  0.268 1.14 
Reduce transportation emissions  All three  -0.006 -0.02 
Reduce supply chain emissions  All three  0.389 1.26 
Intercept    -9.997 -10.25 
Pseudo R2    0.2626 
N     1,683 
a. p<0.01; b. p<0.05; c. p<0.10 33 
 
Table 8:  Panel B – Second Step, OLS estimation controlling for the predicted probabilities of adopting a 
particular incentive scheme (first stage) 
 
  Carbon emissions 
   Coefficient   t-stat 
Only Non-monetary  -0.188 -1.40 
Only Monetary  0.139  1.88
c 
Both Monetary and Non-monetary  0.029 0.28 
    
Predicted Prob. of Providing Only Non-monetary  -0.728 -1.07 
Predicted Prob. of Providing Only Monetary  0.729  1.73
c 
Predicted Prob. of Providing Both Incentives  0.438 0.94 
    
Sales  0.938  22.14
a 
Sustainability Committee  0.080 0.91 
Commercial Opportunities/Risks  0.049 0.70 
% monetary incentives for the country-year  -0.556 -1.22 
% non-monetary incentives for the country-year  0.335 0.57 
Bonus plan  -0.028 -0.31 
Join UN Global Compact by 2002  0.013 0.09 
Reduce carbon emissions  0.301  3.19
a 
Reduce Transportation emissions  -0.151 -1.63 
Reduce supply chain emissions  -0.210  -2.46
b 
Sustainability Audit  0.237  3.06
a 
Intercept 6.177  15.51 
Country Fixed Effects  Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes 
Adj R-Squared  85.11% 
N 1,683 
 
OLS regression using the natural logarithm of carbon emissions as the dependent variable, country fixed effects, 
industry fixed effects, year fixed effects and controlling for the predicted probabilities of adopting a particular 
incentive scheme. All standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
a. p<0.01; b. p<0.05; c. p<0.10 
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Appendix I – Investor CDP Survey Sample Compositions 
Country  Office 
Sample size 
(The largest companies, as measured by market capitalization) 
Asia (ex-Japan) 
Association for Sustainable and 
Responsible Investment in Asia 
(ASrIA) - Partner to CDP 
170 largest Asian companies (excluding Japan, China, India & 
Korea) - Hong Kong (75), Taiwan (25 companies), Malaysia (15), 
Singapore (23), Indonesia (10 ), Thailand (10), Philippines (10), and 
China (2 
Australia and 
New Zealand 
Investor Group on Climate Change 
(IGCC) - Partners to CDP 
ASX 200 / NZX 50 
Belgium, 
Netherlands, 
Luxembourg 
CDP Germany  Benelux 150 
Brazil 
CDP Brazil / Latin America together 
with the Brazilian Association of 
Pension Funds (ABRAPP), Fábrica 
Éthica Brasil and BANCO REAL – 
Partners to CDP 
80 largest companies in Brazil listed on the BOVESPA São Paolo 
Stock Exchange 
Canada  CDP North America  Canada 200 
Central & 
Eastern Europe 
(CEE) 
Iparfejlesztési Közalapítvány (IFKA – 
Public Foundation for the Progress of 
the Industry) - Partner to CDP 
CEE 100 largest companies in CEE - Poland (56), Hungary (9), 
Slovenia (8), Czech Republic (6), Slovakia (4), Lithuania (4), 
Romania (3), Austria (2), Netherlands (2), (Serbia (1), Croatia (1), 
UK (1), Estonia (2) and USA (1) 
China  Local Agent: SynTao  China 100 
Europe Europe 
FTSEurofirst 300 Eurozone: 300 largest companies in Europe - UK 
(62), France (52), Germany (35), Switzerland (27), Spain (20), 
Sweden (19), Italy (18), Netherlands (14), Belgium (10 ), Norway 
(7), Austria (6), Denmark (6 ), Finland (6), Portugal (5), Ireland (4), 
Luxembourg (4), Greece (2), Australia (1), Mexico (1) and the USA 
(1) 
France  CDP France  SBF 250 
Germany and 
Austria 
CDP Germany  Germany and Austria 250 
Global CDP  UK and USA offices 
Global 500: Top 500 companies within the FTSE Global Equity 
Index Series 
India  Confederation of Indian Industry (CII  India 200 35 
 
CESD), and WWF India - Partners to 
CDP 
Iberia 125 
CDP Southern Europe together with 
ECODES and BBVA - Partners to 
CDP 
Spain 85: largest companies within IBEX 35 and FTSE Spain All 
Cap Index and Portugal 40 
Ireland  CDP Ireland  Ireland 40 
Italy 
CDPSouthern Europe, together with 
Accenture, Banca Monte Paschi di 
Sienna and the Kyoto Club - Partners 
to CDP 
Italy 100 
Japan  CDP Japan  Japan 500 
Latin America 
CDP Brazil / Latin America together 
with the Brazilian Institute of Investor 
Relations (IBRI) and Fábrica Éthica 
Brasil - Partner to CDP 
Latin America 50: 50 largest companies in Latin America - Brazil 
(16), Mexico (14 ), Chile (13), Peru (5) and Argentina (2) 
Korea 
Korean Sustainability Investing Forum 
(KoSIF) and Eco-Frontier - Partners to 
CDP 
KRX 200: Korea Exchange 200 Index 
Nordic Region 
CDP Nordic, together with ATP and 
KLP Asset Management - Partners to 
CDP 
Nordic 260: 260 largest companies in Nordic region - Sweden (90), 
Norway (65), Denmark (44), Finland (48), Bermuda (3), UK (3), 
and Canada (2), Cyprus (1), Iceland (1), Belgium (1), Malta (1), 
USA (1) 
Russia  CDP London  RTS Index 50: 50 largest companies in Russia 
South Africa 
National Business Initiative (NBI) - 
Partner to CDP 
FTSE/JSE 100 
Switzerland 
CDP Germany, together with Ethos 
and Pictet Asset Management - 
Partners to CDP 
Switzerland 100: 100 of the largest companies (SPI Large & Mid 
Cap (SOCI)) 
Turkey 
Sabanci University Corporate 
Governance Forum –Partners to CDP 
ISE 100: 100 of the largest companies 
UK  CDP UK  FTSE 350 
USA  CDP North America  S&P 500 
Electric Utilities  CDP UK and International Partners  250 of the largest Electric Utilities companies globally 
Transport  CDP UK and International Partners  100 of the largest Transport companies globally 36 
 
 
Appendix II – Investor CDP Survey Sample Answers 
The following 2009 sample answers to Q26.2 provide a glimpse into what firms mean by monetary 
incentives or non-monetary incentives when they answer the question. 
Monetary incentives:  
…At a lower management level relevant managers' performance targets are related to the climate change 
program objectives and personal bonuses are influenced by the progress in achieving the goals. A senior 
manager owns the GHG target… 
…Allianz managers that are in charge of climate change products and services have their incentives 
related to monetary rewards. Allianz Group is furthermore considering the introduction of a monetary 
incentive scheme for individual Allianz operating entities and executives that are responsible for the 
reduction of GHG emissions in line with our Group Climate Strategy. Such a bonus related incentive is 
already in place at Allianz Germany for respective managers implementing carbon emission reduction 
measures… 
 
…BG Group operates a cash-based Annual Incentive Scheme (AIS) for its employees. The performance 
of both the company and the individual combine to determine the value of the award paid under the AIS.  
The GHG reductions targets form part of the scorecard for the group (which covers all employees) against 
which performance is evaluated… 
 
Non-monetary incentives: 
…ConAgra Foods recognizes project teams for outstanding projects related to “Climate Change and 
Energy Efficiency” (as well as four other categories related to sustainability performance) through our 
internal Sustainable Development Awards program. Team members from the five project finalists in each 37 
 
category are invited to Omaha for an awards event and conference.  Project teams recognized with a 
Sustainable Development Award are given $5,000 to donate to an environmental nonprofit in their local 
community…  
 
…Through the ISO14001 certification process, Air France - KLM is involving each employee in order to 
inform him about company's environmental policy and to stimulate him to participate actively into the Air 
France - KLM commitments, which includes climate change issues… 
 
…Campbell has several employee recognition programs that can and have been used to provide 
incentives for management of GHG targets.  The Company’s most prestigious global recognition, the 
Campbell Extraordinary Performance Awards has a specific Sustainability Category and both of last 
year’s winners in that category included projects with measurable impacts on GHG targets… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 